The Microsoft Case: What Can a Dominant Firm Do to Defend Its Market Position?
AbstractThis paper examines the competitive actions taken by Microsoft in its "browser war" with Netscape, most importantly Microsoft's decisions to give away Explorer free of charge, integrate Explorer into its dominant Windows operating system and pay online service providers for exclusive distribution. Consumers benefited significantly from these actions, but the fundamental economic question is whether Microsoft abused its existing market power when competing in this way. A detailed analysis of Microsoft's conduct and the economics of competition for distribution suggests that severe limits placed on Microsoft's behavior would not be welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 15 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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