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A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries

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Author Info
Jan K. Brueckner
Harris Selod

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Abstract

This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis of squatter formalization policies. (JEL O15, Q15, R14)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1257/pol.1.1.28
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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.28
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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 1 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 28-51
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:1:y:2009:i:1:p:28-51

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  1. Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, 2002. "Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property Rights in Urban Ecuador," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(482), pages 986-1019, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1984. "Tenure Security and Urban Squatting," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(4), pages 556-67, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Friedman, Joseph & Jimenez, Emmanuel & Mayo, Stephen K., 1988. "The demand for tenure security in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 185-198, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hoy, Michael & Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1991. "Squatters' Rights and Urban Development: An Economic Perspective," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(229), pages 79-92, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Zenou, Yves, 2002. "How do firms redline workers?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 391-408, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Duranton, Gilles, 2008. "From Cities to Productivity and Growth in Developing Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 6634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Jimenez, Emmanuel, 1985. "Urban squatting and community organization in developing countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 69-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2007. "The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(1), pages 209-241, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lall, Somik V. & Lundberg, Mattias K.A. & Shalizi, Zmarak, 2008. "Implications of alternate policies on welfare of slum dwellers: Evidence from Pune, India," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 56-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Erica Field, 2007. "Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1561-1602, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Galiani, Sebastian & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2004. "Effects of land titling on child health," Economics and Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 353-372, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Erica Field, 2005. "Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 279-290, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Zenou, Yves & Boccard, Nicolas, 2000. "Racial Discrimination and Redlining in Cities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 260-285, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

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