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Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations to Predict Police Misconduct

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  • Kyle Rozema
  • Max Schanzenbach

Abstract

In response to high-profile cases of police misconduct, reformers are calling for greater use of civilian allegations in identifying potential problem officers. This paper applies an Empirical Bayes framework to data on civilian allegations and civil rights litigation in Chicago to assess the predictive value of civilian allegations for serious future misconduct. We find a strong relationship between allegations and future civil rights litigation, especially for the very worst officers. The worst 1 percent of officers, as measured by civilian allegations, generate almost 5 times the number of payouts and over 4 times the total damage payouts in civil rights litigation. These findings suggest that intervention efforts could be fruitfully concentrated among a relatively small group.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, 2019. "Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations to Predict Police Misconduct," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 225-268, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:11:y:2019:i:2:p:225-68
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160573
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
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    Cited by:

    1. Saltiel, Fernando & Tuttle, Cody, 2022. "Business Cycles and Police Hires," IZA Discussion Papers 15665, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Gregory DeAngelo & Matthew Gomies & Rustam Romaniuc, 2023. "Do civilian complaints against police get punished?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 453-482, September.
    3. Stroube, Bryan K., 2021. "Using allegations to understand selection bias in organizations: Misconduct in the Chicago Police Department," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 149-165.
    4. Boylan, Richard T., 2022. "Should cities disband their police departments?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    5. Federico Masera, 2022. "The economics of policing and crimeThe economics of policing and crime," Chapters, in: Paolo Buonanno & Paolo Vanin & Juan Vargas (ed.), A Modern Guide to the Economics of Crime, chapter 2, pages 12-29, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Fernando Saltiel & Cody Tuttle, 2023. "Business Cycles and Police Hires," Working Papers 288, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    7. Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams & John Rappaport, 2019. "Collective Bargaining and Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida," CESifo Working Paper Series 7718, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • K38 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Human Rights Law; Gender Law; Animal Rights Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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