Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements
AbstractWe consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don't know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms. Conversely, good market news slows the release of information by firms. Thus, our model generates clustering of negative announcements. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms can preemptively disclose their own information prior to the arrival of external information. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock returns. (JEL D21, D83, G12, G14, L11)
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 101 (2011)
Issue (Month): 7 (December)
Other versions of this item:
- Acharya, Viral V & DeMarzo, Peter & Kremer, Ilan, 2008. "Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements," CEPR Discussion Papers 6985, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Acharya, Viral V & DeMarzo, Peter & Kremer, Ilan, 2011. "Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements," CEPR Discussion Papers 8680, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Viral V. Acharya & Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer, 2010. "Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements," NBER Working Papers 16485, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- G. William Schwert, 1990.
"Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change Over Time?,"
NBER Working Papers
2798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schwert, G William, 1989. " Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change over Time?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(5), pages 1115-53, December.
- Officer, R R, 1973. "The Variability of the Market Factor of the New York Stock Exchange," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(3), pages 434-53, July.
- Damodaran, Aswath, 1985. "Economic Events, Information Structure, and the Return-Generating Process," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(04), pages 423-434, December.
- Campbell, John Y. & Hentschel, Ludger, 1992.
"No news is good news *1: An asymmetric model of changing volatility in stock returns,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 281-318, June.
- Hentschel, Ludger & Campbell, John, 1992. "No News is Good News: An Asymmetric Model of Changing Volatility in Stock Returns," Scholarly Articles 3220232, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- John Y. Campbell & Ludger Hentschel, 1991. "No News is Good News: An Asymmetric Model of Changing Volatility in Stock Returns," NBER Working Papers 3742, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alles, Lakshman A & Kling, John L, 1994. "Regularities in the Variation of Skewness in Asset Returns," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association & Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 17(3), pages 427-38, Fall.
- Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Disclosures and Asset Returns," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 105-133, January.
- Gregory S. Miller, 2002. "Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 173-204, 03.
- Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 2000. "Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 479-519.
- Ang, Andrew & Chen, Joseph, 2002. "Asymmetric correlations of equity portfolios," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 443-494, March.
- Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Disclosure Risk and Price Drift," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 351-379, 05.
- Gennotte, Gerard & Trueman, Brett, 1996. "The Strategic Timing of Corporate Disclosures," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(2), pages 665-90.
- Burgstahler, David & Dichev, Ilia, 1997. "Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 99-126, December.
- Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441, May.
- Albuquerque, Rui, 2010.
"Skewness in Stock Returns:Reconciling the Evidence on Firm versus Aggregate Returns,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7896, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rui Albuquerque, 2012. "Skewness in Stock Returns: Reconciling the Evidence on Firm Versus Aggregate Returns," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(5), pages 1630-1673.
- Tauchen, George & Zhou, Hao, 2011.
"Realized jumps on financial markets and predicting credit spreads,"
Journal of Econometrics,
Elsevier, vol. 160(1), pages 102-118, January.
- George Tauchen & Hao Zhou, 2006. "Realized jumps on financial markets and predicting credit spreads," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2006-35, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Aboody, David & Kasznik, Ron, 2000. "CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 73-100, February.
- Teoh, Siew Hong & Hwang, Chuan Yang, 1991. "Nondisclosure and Adverse Disclosure as Signals of Firm Value," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 283-313.
- Diamond, Douglas W, 1985. " Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-94, September.
- Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
- Guttman, Ilan & Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2012. "Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure," Research Papers 2102, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.