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Auctions with Limited Commitment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2026. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment: Minimal Canonical Contracts," Papers 2605.19884, arXiv.org, revised May 2026.
  3. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
  4. Ahrash Dianat & Mikhail Freer, 2021. "Credibility in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Test," Papers 2105.00204, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  5. Andrew Koh & Sivakorn Sanguanmoo & Kei Uzui, 2024. "Informational Puts," Papers 2411.09191, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
  6. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024. "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 288, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  7. Junyan Guan & Boli Xu, 2026. "Reserve Price Signaling With Public Information: Evidence From Online Auto Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 57(1), pages 245-266, March.
  8. Liu, Qingmin & Mierendorff, Konrad & Shi, Xianwen, 2025. "Coasian equilibria in sequential auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
  9. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
  10. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
  11. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022. "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  12. Meryem Essaidi & Matheus V. X. Ferreira & S. Matthew Weinberg, 2022. "Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions," Papers 2205.14758, arXiv.org.
  13. Martino Banchio & Frank Yang, 2021. "Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment," Papers 2102.07742, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
  14. Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 711-730, May.
  15. Jingyu Liu & Bolin Zhang & Lin William Cong & Siguang Li & Xuechao Wang, 2026. "From PBS to ePBS: the Microstructure of Block Building," Papers 2607.11240, arXiv.org.
  16. Xu, Xiaoshu, 2025. "Optimal auctions with sequential arrival: Allowing for re-auction and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  17. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  18. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2024. "Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_519, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  19. Matheus V. X. Ferreira & S. Matthew Weinberg, 2020. "Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments," Papers 2004.01598, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
  20. Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  21. Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.
  22. Martino Banchio & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Frank Yang, 2025. "Dynamic Threats to Credible Auctions," Papers 2509.21439, arXiv.org.
  23. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  24. Chang, Dongkyu & Lee, Jong Jae, 2022. "Price skimming: Commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  25. Patrick Hummel, 2018. "Reserve prices in repeated auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 273-299, March.
  26. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.
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