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Incentive Structures Maximizing Residual Gain under Incomplete Information

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Cited by:

  1. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2014. "Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," NBER Working Papers 20315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Jean-Louis ARCAND & Mbolatiana DE MONTALEMBERT RAMBONILAZA, 1999. "Is Adverse Selection Relevant? Spence-Mirlees Meets the Tunisian Peasant," Working Papers 199923, CERDI.
  3. Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018. "Moral Hazard, Uncertain Technologies, and Linear Contracts," Working Papers 201806, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
  4. Garrett, Daniel F., 2020. "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," TSE Working Papers 20-1140, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  5. Herman Demeze & Issofa Moyouwou & Roland Pongou, 2016. "The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis," Working Papers 1611e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  6. M. A. Taslim, 1992. "A Survey of Theories of Cropshare Tenancy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 68(3), pages 254-275, September.
  7. Giese, Henning & Koch, Reinald & Gamm, Markus, 2022. "Tax avoidance and vertical interlocks within multinational enterprises," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 270, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
  8. Keler Marku & Sergio Ocampo & Jean‐Baptiste Tondji, 2024. "Robust contracts in common agency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 55(2), pages 199-229, June.
  9. Vinicius Carrasco & Vitor Farinha Luz & Paulo K. Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2019. "Robust mechanisms: the curvature case," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 203-222, July.
  10. Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2014. "Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure," Working Papers 064-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  11. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padro i Miquel, 2014. "Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," Working Papers 062-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  12. James, William E. & Roumasset, James A., 1979. "Explaining Variations In Share Contracts: Land Quality, Population Pressure And Technological Change," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 23(2), pages 1-12, August.
  13. Tianjiao Dai & Juuso Toikka, 2022. "Robust Incentives for Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1583-1613, July.
  14. Li, Yan & Qiu, Yueming & Wang, Yi David, 2014. "Explaining the contract terms of energy performance contracting in China: The importance of effective financing," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 401-411.
  15. Sylvain Chassang, 2013. "Calibrated Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(5), pages 1935-1971, September.
  16. Rumen Kostadinov, 2023. "Worst-case Regret in Ambiguous Dynamic Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-08, McMaster University.
  17. Martin Dumav, 2021. "Moral Hazard, Dynamic Incentives, and Ambiguous Perceptions," Papers 2110.15229, arXiv.org.
  18. Bernat, G. Andrew, Jr., 1987. "Share Leasing And Production Efficiency," Staff Reports 278000, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
  19. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
  20. Th'eo Durandard & Udayan Vaidya & Boli Xu, 2025. "Robust Contracting for Sequential Search," Papers 2504.17948, arXiv.org.
  21. Jun Yeong Lee & Grant Durbahn & Peter F. Orazem & Wendong Zhang, 2023. "The roles of risk preferences, selection, and uncertain returns on land contracts," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 54(2), pages 220-233, March.
  22. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
  23. Alphonse Fodouop Fotso & Roland Pongou & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2024. "A Behavioral Test and Classification of Solution Concepts in Games," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 1-35, December.
  24. Demeze, Herman & Moyouwou, Issofa & Pongou, Roland, 2016. "The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis," MPRA Paper 70607, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Yingni Guo & Eran Shmaya, 2023. "Regret‐Minimizing Project Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(5), pages 1567-1593, September.
  26. Ollier, Sandrine & Thomas, Lionel, 2013. "Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2383-2403.
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