Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity

Citations

Cited by:

1. Hedlund, Jonas, 2024. "Signaling through Bayesian persuasion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 15-27.
2. Ian M. Schmutte & Nathan Yoder, 2022. "Information Design for Differential Privacy," Papers 2202.05452, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
3. Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2022. "Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(3), pages 2520-2545, August.
4. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
5. Yaron Azrieli & Rachana Das, 2025. "Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2508.09464, arXiv.org.
6. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
   • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02400053, HAL.
   • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-02400053, HAL.
   • Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," TSE Working Papers 22-1341, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
7. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
   • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Long Information Design," PSE Working Papers halshs-02400053, HAL.
   • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03700394, HAL.
   • Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," TSE Working Papers 22-1341, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   • Marie Laclau & Frédéric Koessler & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-03342880, HAL.
   • Marie Laclau & Frédéric Koessler & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03342880, HAL.
   • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," Post-Print hal-03700394, HAL.
   • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Long Information Design," Working Papers halshs-02400053, HAL.
   • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-02400053, HAL.
   • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02400053, HAL.
8. Alon, Shiri & Auster, Sarah & Gayer, Gabi & Minardi, Stefania, 2023. "Persuasion with Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 18428, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
   • Shiri Alon & Sarah Auster & Gabi Gayer & Stefania Minardi, 2023. "Persuasion with Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 245, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
   • Shiri Alon & Sarah Auster & Gabi Gayer & Stefania Minardi, 2023. "Persuasion With Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_443, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
9. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
   • Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018. "Noisy Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
10. Wilfried Youmbi Fotso & Xun Chen, 2026. "Moral Hazard in Delegated Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2604.10006, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
11. Xu, Shuo, 2025. "Persuasion through information cost design," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
12. Lian, Zeng & Xu, Shuo & Zheng, Jie, 2025. "Entrant-optimal learning in a contest game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
13. Yunus C. Aybas & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Persuasion with Coarse Communication," Papers 1910.13547, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2026.
14. Mark Whitmeyer, 2019. "Bayesian Elicitation," Papers 1902.00976, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
15. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
16. Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton, 2024. "The persuasion duality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.
    • Piotr Dworczak & Anton Kolotilin, 2019. "The Persuasion Duality," Papers 1910.11392, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
17. Hyeonggyun Ko, 2025. "Persuasion in the Long Run: When history matters," Papers 2508.01662, arXiv.org.
18. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Constrained Information Design," Papers 1811.03588, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
19. Reema Deori & Ankur A. Kulkarni, 2024. "Informativeness and Trust in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2408.13822, arXiv.org.
20. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
21. Francesco Bilotta & Christoph Carnehl & Justus Preusser, 2026. "Delegated Information Provision," Papers 2603.10867, arXiv.org, revised May 2026.
22. Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
23. Vora, Anuj S. & Kulkarni, Ankur A., 2024. "Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 48-66.
24. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
    • Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
25. Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2021. "Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions," Papers 2110.08563, arXiv.org.
26. Yaron Azrieli, 2021. "Constrained versus Unconstrained Rational Inattention," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, January.
27. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2022. "Discovery through Trial Balloons," Papers 2211.02743, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.