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On Communication and Collusion

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Youssef Saida, 2021. "Combining Financial Information and Corporate Social Responsibility Related Information for Characterizing Corporate Disclosure: Some Insights From Moroccan Context," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 12(5), pages 58-70, October.
  2. Donelson, Dain C. & Hutzler, Christian M. & Rhodes, Adrienne, 2025. "Does antitrust enforcement against interlocking directorates impair corporate governance?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2).
  3. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Walckiers, Alexis, 2017. "A theory of hub-and-spoke collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 353-370.
  4. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(2), pages 193-216, March.
  5. Sindri Engilbertsson & Sander Onderstal & Leonard Treuren, 2025. "How the design of cartel fines affects prices: Evidence from the lab," Working Papers of Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven 779661, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven.
  6. Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2021. "The leniency rule revisited: Experiments on cartel formation with open communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
  7. Rohit Lamba & Sergey Zhuk, 2022. "Pricing with algorithms," Papers 2205.04661, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
  8. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2018. "Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 58-87.
  9. Zhang, Tianyu, 2025. "Geographically dispersed signing auditors and audit quality," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3).
  10. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2019. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
  11. Turner, Douglas C., 2024. "The impact of cartel dissolution on prices: Evidence from the air cargo cartel," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
  12. Fu, Renhui & Ma, Chen & Zeng, Yamin & Zhang, Junsheng, 2024. "Determinants and consequences of sales/production report issuance," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(5).
  13. Welter, Dominik & Napel, Stefan, 2016. "Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145886, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  14. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
  15. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03760756, HAL.
  16. Odenkirchen, Johannes, 2017. "Pricing Behavior of Cartel Outsiders in Incomplete Cartels," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168309, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  17. Heller, Yuval, 2017. "Instability of belief-free equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 261-286.
  18. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
  19. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Ali I. Ozkes, 2023. "Strategic environment effect and communication," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(3), pages 588-621, July.
  20. Massenkoff, Maxim & DeScioli, Peter & Thomas, Kyle & Pinker, Steven, 2025. "What happens in vagueness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
  21. Harrington, Joseph E., 2017. "A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 140-158.
  22. Porter, Robert H., 2020. "Mergers and coordinated effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  23. Kim, Jeong Yeol, 2025. "Delegation and strategic collusion under antitrust policies: An experiment," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
  24. Melissa Carlson & Barbara Koremenos, 2021. "Cooperation Failure or Secret Collusion? Absolute Monarchs and Informal Cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 95-135, January.
  25. Aaron Barkley & David P. Byrne & Xiaosong Wu, 2022. "Price effects of calling out market power: A study of the COVID‐19 oil price shock," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 923-941, November.
  26. Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022. "A reputation for honesty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  27. Do, Jihwan, 2022. "Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  28. Maximilian Andres, 2024. "Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication," CEPA Discussion Papers 75, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
  29. Yu Awaya, 2021. "Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-10, October.
  30. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Post-Print halshs-03760756, HAL.
  31. Hemant Bhargava & Antoine Dubus & David Ronayne & Shiva Shekhar, 2026. "The Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 72(2), pages 1472-1488, February.
  32. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2016. "How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 332-359.
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