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The Envious Punisher: Understanding Third and Second Party Punishment with Simple Games

Author

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  • Andreas Leibbrandt
  • Ra�l L�pez-P�rez

Abstract

We provide a systematic comparison of punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subject design in ten simple games. We apply the classification analysis by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) and find that a parsimonious model assuming subjects are either envious or selfish best explains the punishment from both third and second parties. Third and second parties punish richer co-players, even if they chose a socially or Pareto-efficient allocation or if they are merely bystanders who made no choice. Despite their unaffected position, we do not find that third parties punish in a more impartial or normative manner.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Leibbrandt & Ra�l L�pez-P�rez, 2008. "The Envious Punisher: Understanding Third and Second Party Punishment with Simple Games," IEW - Working Papers 373, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:373
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    File URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp_iew/iewwp373.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Baumard, 2011. "Punishment is not a group adaptation," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, June.
    2. Leibbrandt, Andreas & Sääksvuori, Lauri, 2012. "Communication in intergroup conflicts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1136-1147.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Envy; fairness; inequity aversion; norms; punishment; reciprocity;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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