IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/umiodp/42015.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Better winding up: A proposal for improved winding up of executory contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Dilger, Alexander

Abstract

An evaluation problem exists when winding up executory contracts in case of insolvency. The trustee has difficulties in accurately considering the claim for damages that arises if he chooses to reject a contract instead of accepting it. An unequal treatment of creditors and inefficiencies follow. However, a simple reform can solve this problem. If an executory contract is accepted by the trustee, there should be the same claim for damages as if it had been rejected. Only the difference between this claim for damages and the initial claim should be paid directly out of the estate.

Suggested Citation

  • Dilger, Alexander, 2015. "Better winding up: A proposal for improved winding up of executory contracts," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 4/2015, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:42015
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/110616/1/826264611.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other
    • K35 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Personal Bankruptcy Law
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:umiodp:42015. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ilmuede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.