A Simple Coase-Like Mechanism that Transfers Control of Government Spending Levels from Politicians to Voters
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Keywordspolitical incentives; government spending; mechanism design; balanced budget amendments;
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-05-19 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2007-05-19 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-05-19 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2007-05-19 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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