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Corporate Opportunity Waiver Laws Did Not Produce Disloyal Managers

Author

Listed:
  • Geng, Heng (Griffin)
  • Hau, Harald
  • Liu, Pengfei

Abstract

Corporate Opportunity Waiver (COW) laws permit firms to suspend fiduciary duties related to corporate opportunities. Fich, Harford, and Tran (2023) argue that these laws reduced firm innovation and lowered corporate valuation for research-intensive firms. However, we find that over 90% of the regressions we re-examine are non-replicable using correct samples and specifications. We further show that the reported decline in Tobin's q is confounded by the effects of the dot-com bubble burst. Moreover, public firms subject to COWs reduce takeover defenses, contradicting their argument that COW laws weaken corporate governance. Overall, their conclusion that COW laws foster managerial disloyalty and harm shareholder value is not supported by the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Geng, Heng (Griffin) & Hau, Harald & Liu, Pengfei, 2026. "Corporate Opportunity Waiver Laws Did Not Produce Disloyal Managers," I4R Discussion Paper Series 285, The Institute for Replication (I4R).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:285
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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