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Corporate Governance, Expected Operating Performance, and Pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Oren Fuerst

    () (Columbia Business School)

  • Sok-Hyon Kang

    () (School of Business and Public Management)

Abstract

We examine whether ownership and governance characteristics are associated with the firm s operating performance and stock price. We hypothesize that while ownership structure and governance mechanisms impact the firm's operating performance, they can also impact stakeholders abilities to expropriate rents from other stakeholders. We use a two-step estimation approach to assess whether the benefits of a better governance system manifest as higher operating performance, or as a premium on share price. To mitigate potential problems from using conventional accounting performance measures, we use Ohlson s (1995) expected residual income (ERI) valuation metric, which is conceptually superior to conventional measures. Results suggest that (1) higher share ownership of the CEO, corporate insiders, and outside directors has a strong positive impact on both firm performance (measured by the ERI metric) and market value; (2) large ownership of outside shareholders has a negative impact on the firm s operating performance; (3) presence of a controlling shareholder has an adverse distributive effects for other shareholders; (4) after controlling for ownership, there is no improvement in operating performance or share value from having greater representation of outside directors, or having a larger board; and (5) variables representing the CEO s stature the CEO s tenure and the board chairmanship have a negative impact on the firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Oren Fuerst & Sok-Hyon Kang, 1998. "Corporate Governance, Expected Operating Performance, and Pricing," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm108, Yale School of Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm108
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-087 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Aymen Ammari & Sarra Amdouni & Ahmed Zemzem & Abderrazak Ellouze, 2016. "The Effect of Monitoring Committees on the Relationship between Board Structure and Firm Performance," Journal of Risk and Financial Management, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(4), pages 1-13, December.
    3. Wided Bouaine & Lanouar Charfeddine & Mohamed Arouri & Frédéric Teulon, 2014. "The influence of CEO departure type and board characteristics on firm performance," Working Papers 2014-87, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    4. repec:bbz:fcpbbr:v:9:y:2012:i:3:p:71-93 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Hwang, Dar-Yeh & Wu, Wei-Hsiung, 2007. "Financial system reform in Taiwan," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 21-41, February.
    6. Chen, Chen-Wen & Liu, Victor W., 2013. "Corporate governance under asymmetric information: Theory and evidence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 280-291.
    7. repec:spr:jknowl:v:8:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13132-015-0302-3 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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