A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign States
Do emerging economies need a bankruptcy procedure to handle potential debt defaults? Jeff Sachs and John Williamson, for example, say yes. But others, including notably the two Working Groups who issued reports on Crisis Resolution (on behalf of G10 and the Institute of International Finance) say no - mainly on account of "moral hazard" ascribed to debtors. But could the replacement of syndicated bank lending with widely held bond debt under the Brady plan have posed a problem of inter-creditor conflict sufficiently pressing to have tipped the balance in favour of having an orderly procedure?
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