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Central bank Financial Independence

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  • J.Ramon Martinez-Resano

    (Bank of Spain)

Abstract

Central bank independence is a multifaceted institutional design. The financial component has been seldom analysed. This paper intends to set a comprehensive conceptual background for central bank financial independence. Quite often central banks are modelled as robot like maximizers of some goal. This perspective neglects the fact that central bank functions are inevitably deployed on its balance sheet and have effects on its income statement. A financially independent central bank exhibits the adequate balance sheet structure and earnings generation capacity to efficiently perform its functions. From a long term perspective, as far as the demand for banknotes is maintained seignorage waters down any central bank financial independence concern. However, from a short term perspective central bank financial vulnerability may condition its effective independence. Vulnerability may be real or accounting based. However, no matter its origin, institutional solutions are needed to minimize their impact. Adequate capitalization turns out to be a key issue. Alternatively, contingent capital in the form of institutional arrangements to bear central bank losses may be a (second- best) solution. The paper analyses in the context of simple VAR model the interplay between capitalization, accounting rules and dividend distribution. This analysis is preceded by a thorough discussion of the risk return profile of central banks net return on assets. Three main conclusions shape the input to the capitalization model. Central banks return on assets can be very volatile from a short term perspective. From a medium term perspective, natural earnings generation cycles dampen down volatility. On average, central banks net return on assets typically exhibits a discount over government debt financing cost. These observations shape the central bank financing planning problem as follows. Namely, the size of the discount relative to the social costs that would arise in case of a lack of central bank independence, along with central bank exposure to risks and the volatility thereof, determine the incentives of the government to maintain an excess of financial assets in the form of central bank capital. Actually, the working of smoothing mechanisms operating across time on central banks earnings leads to a distinction between short term and medium term capital, i.e. the optimum capital solution is a band. In the same vein, the need to maintain optimal consistence between central bank financial strength and dividends distribution policy leads also to smoothing proposals for pay out policy.

Suggested Citation

  • J.Ramon Martinez-Resano, 2004. "Central bank Financial Independence," Macroeconomics 0403011, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0403011 Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 70
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    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/mac/papers/0403/0403011.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Efrem Castelnuovo, 2004. "Describing the Fed's conduct with simple Taylor rules: is interest rate smoothing important?," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 12, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
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    4. Gabriel Srour, 2001. "Why Do Central Banks Smooth Interest Rates?," Staff Working Papers 01-17, Bank of Canada.
    5. William B. English & William R. Nelson & Brian P. Sack, 2002. "Interpreting the significance of lagged interest rate in estimated monetary policy rules," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Sack, Brian & Wieland, Volker, 2000. "Interest-rate smoothing and optimal monetary policy: a review of recent empirical evidence," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, pages 205-228.
    7. Alex Cukierman & Anton Muscatelli, 2001. "Do Central Banks have Precautionary Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability?," Working Papers 2002_4, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Mar 2002.
    8. Surico, Paolo, 2003. "US Monetary Policy Rules: the Case for Asymmetric Preferences," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 199, Royal Economic Society.
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    Cited by:

    1. JoAnne Morris & Tonny Lybek, 2004. "Central Bank Governance; A Survey of Boards and Management," IMF Working Papers 04/226, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Alain Ize, 2005. "Capitalizing Central Banks: A Net Worth Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(2), pages 289-310, September.
    3. Luca Papi, 2011. "Central bank capital adequacy for central banks with or without a monetary policy," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 49, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Banking Capital; Independence; Accounting; Profits;

    JEL classification:

    • E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

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