The Deadlist of Games: A Model of the Duel
Recent historical research indicates that ritualistic dueling had a rational basis. Basically, under certain social and economic conditions, individuals must fight in order to maintain their personal credit and social standing. A model of the duel, therefore, can be constructed. We model the duel as a two--players sequential game. This paper shows that the optimal strategy of each player depends upon the value of three parameters, namely, ``cost of fighting,'' ``cost of shame'', and ``value of courage.''
|Date of creation:||09 Aug 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - pef; prepared on pc; pages: 14 ; figures: request from author|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://188.8.131.52|
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