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The Deadlist of Games: A Model of the Duel


  • Eliane Catilina

    (American University)

  • Robert E. Wright


Recent historical research indicates that ritualistic dueling had a rational basis. Basically, under certain social and economic conditions, individuals must fight in order to maintain their personal credit and social standing. A model of the duel, therefore, can be constructed. We model the duel as a two--players sequential game. This paper shows that the optimal strategy of each player depends upon the value of three parameters, namely, ``cost of fighting,'' ``cost of shame'', and ``value of courage.''

Suggested Citation

  • Eliane Catilina & Robert E. Wright, 2002. "The Deadlist of Games: A Model of the Duel," General Economics and Teaching 0207001, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0207001
    Note: Type of Document - pef; prepared on pc; pages: 14 ; figures: request from author

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    teaching; game theory; general economics;

    JEL classification:

    • A - General Economics and Teaching

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