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On the NP-Completeness of Finding an Optimal Strategy in Games with Common Payoffs


  • Francis C. Chu

    (Cornell University)

  • Joseph Y. Halpern

    (Cornell University)


Given a finite game with common payoffs (i.e. the players have completely common interests), we show that the problem of determining whether there exists a joint strategy where each player nets at least k is NP-complete.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis C. Chu & Joseph Y. Halpern, 2000. "On the NP-Completeness of Finding an Optimal Strategy in Games with Common Payoffs," Game Theory and Information 0004011, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004011
    Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on Unix; pages: 7; figures: included

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(3), pages 263-300.
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    Cited by:

    1. Demuynck, Thomas, 2011. "The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 425-433.
    2. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    3. Tim Roughgarden, 2010. "Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 193-236, January.

    More about this item


    common payoff games; NP-completeness;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General

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