On the NP-Completeness of Finding an Optimal Strategy in Games with Common Payoffs
Given a finite game with common payoffs (i.e. the players have completely common interests), we show that the problem of determining whether there exists a joint strategy where each player nets at least k is NP-complete.
|Date of creation:||22 Nov 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - PDF; prepared on Unix; pages: 7; figures: included|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://126.96.36.199 |
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