IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v30y2001i1p99-106.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the NP-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs

Author

Listed:
  • Francis Chu

    (Department of Computer Science, Upson Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7501, USA)

  • Joseph Halpern

    (Department of Computer Science, Upson Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7501, USA)

Abstract

Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a joint strategy where each player has an expected payoff of at least r is NP-complete as a function of the number of nodes in the extensive-form representation of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Chu & Joseph Halpern, 2001. "On the NP-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(1), pages 99-106.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:99-106 Note: Received January 2001/Final version May 1, 2001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/1030001/10300099.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael R. Baye & Guoqiang Tian & Jianxin Zhou, 1993. "Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 935-948.
    2. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26.
    3. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
    4. Leo K. Simon, 1987. "Games with Discontinuous Payoffs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 569-597.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Demuynck, Thomas, 2011. "The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 425-433.
    2. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    3. Tim Roughgarden, 2010. "Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 193-236.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:99-106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.