Strongly Coalition-Proof Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities
We identify two sufficient conditions for games with strategic complementarities to have a unique equilibrium that is "strongly coalition-proof," that is, immune to incentive-compatible deviations by coalitions. If a Nash equilibrium is unique, then it is strongly coalition-proof. Also, if each player's payoff is increasing (respectively, decreasing) in the other players' strategies, then the maximum (respectively, minimal) equilibrium is the unique strongly coalition-proof equilibrium. We offer several applications of these results, including one to the contracting model of Hart and Moore.
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www-econ.stanford.edu/econ/workp/Email:
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
- Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991.
"Monotone Comparative Statics,"
11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Comparing Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 441-59, June.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & John Geanakoplos & Paul D. Klemperer, 1983. "Multimarket Oligopoly," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 674, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:95002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.