IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/pennca/00-07.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information

Author

Listed:
  • George J. Mailath
  • Alvaro Sandroni

Abstract

Do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives, especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions? We present a two-sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching. Once matched, buyer and seller bargain over the price, taking into account outside options. Efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium. We characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium, and show that equilibria will be constrained efficient. We also show that the degree of diversity in a large market has implications for the extent of any inefficiency.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • George J. Mailath & Alvaro Sandroni, "undated". "Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information," CARESS Working Papres 00-07, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:wop:pennca:00-07
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    2. John H. Nachbar, 1997. "Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 275-310, March.
    3. Anderlini, Luca & Sabourian, Hamid, 1995. "Cooperation and Effective Computability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1337-1369, November.
    4. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
    5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    6. Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
    7. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
    8. Anderlini, L. & Sabourian, H., 1999. "Cooperation and non-halting strategies," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9911, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    9. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    10. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
    11. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
    12. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    13. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    14. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
    15. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 274-279.
    16. K. Binmore & L. Samuelson, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata," Levine's Working Paper Archive 561, David K. Levine.
    17. Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-1193, September.
    18. Y. G. Kim & J. Sobel, 2010. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 374, David K. Levine.
    19. Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 1-37.
    20. Kalyan Chatterjee & Hamid Sabourian, 2000. "Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1491-1510, November.
    21. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hongjun Yan, 2008. "Natural Selection in Financial Markets: Does It Work?," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 1935-1950.
    2. Pietro Dindo & Filippo Massari, 2017. "The Wisdom of the Crowd in Dynamic Economies," Working Papers 2017:17, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    3. Emanuela Sciubba, 2006. "The evolution of portfolio rules and the capital asset pricing model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 123-150, September.
    4. Luo, Guo Ying, 2012. "Conservative traders, natural selection and market efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 310-335.
    5. repec:eee:jetheo:v:172:y:2017:i:c:p:512-557 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Pietro Dindo, 2015. "Survival in Speculative Markets," LEM Papers Series 2015/32, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    7. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David, 2009. "The market organism: Long-run survival in markets with heterogeneous traders," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 1023-1035, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:pennca:00-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/caupaus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.