Antitrust-based remedies and dumping in international trade
The authors explore the possibility of government's seeking to agree to apply competition policy based considerations and disciplines in addressing unfair-trade allegations before turning to"standard"antidumping remedies. The premise of proponents of antidumping actions is that the existence of market power in exporter's home markets, or potential market dominance in the importing (host) market, is an important source of perceived"unfairness."But antidumping authorities do not investigate the existence of such situations. The authors propose that allegations of dumping first be investigated by competition authorities to determine the contestability of the relevant markets. Their proposal does not involve harmonization of competition laws. All that would change from the status quo is that a necessary condition for an antidumping action is that competition authorities find that the exporting firm's home market is not contestable, and conclude that no remedial action is possible through the application of competition law. Ideally, agreement along these lines would be sought in the multilateral (GATT) context, but bilateral or regional trade agreements could also be concluded. For example, European Union cooperationor association agreements might be extended along the lines proposed.
|Date of creation:||31 Aug 1994|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433|
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1347. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.