Convergence of outcomes and evolution of strategic behavior in double auctions
We study the emergence of strategic behavior in double auctions with an equal number n of buyers and sellers, under the distinct assumptions that orders are cleared simultaneously or asynchronously. The evolution of strategic behavior is modeled as a learning process driven by a genetic algorithm. We find that, as the size n of the market grows, allocative inefficiency tends to zero and performance converges to the competitive outcome, regardless of the order-clearing rule. The main result concerns the evolution of strategic behavior. Under simultaneous order-clearing, as n increases, only marginal traders learn to be price takers and make offers equal to their valuations/costs. Under asynchronous order-clearing, as n increases, all intramarginal traders learn to be price makers and make offers equal to the competitive equilibrium price. The nature of the order-clearing rule affects in a fundamental way what kind of strategic behavior we should expect to emerge.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2010|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in Journal of Evolutionary Economics|
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