Strategic Play and Risk Aversion in One-Shot Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
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Cited by:
- David Danz & Dietmar Fehr & Dorothea Kübler, 2012.
"Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(4), pages 622-640, December.
- Dietmar Fehr & Dorothea Kübler & David Danz, 2008. "Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-026, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Dietmar Fehr & Dorothea Kübler & David Danz, 2010. "Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game," CIG Working Papers SP II 2010-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Fehr, Dietmar & Kübler, Dorothea & Danz, David N., 2008. "Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game," IZA Discussion Papers 3627, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Fehr, Dietmar & Kübler, Dorothea & Danz, David, 2008. "Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2008-026, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Dietmar Fehr & Dorothea Kübler & David Danz, 2010. "Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game," CIG Working Papers SP II 2010-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
More about this item
Keywords
games; experiments; beliefs; risk aversion; ambiguity aversion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2008-09-20 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CSE-2008-09-20 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-EXP-2008-09-20 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-09-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2008-09-20 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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