The Dynamics of Price and Advertising as Signals of Quality
A monopolist introduces a new product of either low or high quality. It advertises to make consumers aware of the product and signals product quality using both price and advertising. When consumption does not re- veal product quality, price is higher and advertising is lower than they would be if product quality is observable. Price rises and advertising falls as the fraction of aware consumers increases. When consumption reveals product quality, price is higher and advertising is lower than they would be if prod- uct quality is observable. Price declines as the fraction of aware consumers increases and advertising follows an inverted U shape. We ¯nd support for these empirical predictions from a data set on Direct-to-Consumer advertis- ing on pharmaceutical drugs.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
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