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Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level


  • Diego Rodríguez


We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features: bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there is individual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compare individual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargaining and we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to ex ante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employment relationship play a crucial role in determining wages. High firing costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Our theory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independent of the production function and market power. We derive a simple least squares specification from the theoretical model that allow us to estimate components of the wage premium from coordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordination does not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Labor coordination substantially increases bargaining power but decreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Diego Rodríguez, 1998. "Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level," Economics Working Papers 313, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:313

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Delicado, Pedro, 2001. "Another Look at Principal Curves and Surfaces," Journal of Multivariate Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 84-116, April.
    2. Delicado, Pedro & del Rio, Manuel, 1994. "Bootstrapping the general linear hypothesis test," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-316, October.
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    More about this item


    Individual and collective bargaining; union effects; employer size-wage effect; firing costs;

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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