Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in theEuclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is provedthat any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is a dictatorial. This framework models situationswhere public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within aconfined region that has the shape of a disc.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht|
Phone: +31 (0)43 38 83 830
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1986. "A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 295-99, May.
- Murat Öztürk & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2014.
"On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 83-108, May.
- Öztürk Murat & Peters Hans & Storcken Ton, 2012. "On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences," Research Memorandum 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009.
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
801.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2012. "Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 335-352, July.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Domains, Ranges and Strategy-Proofness: The Case of Single-dipped Preferences," Working Papers 418, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012042. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Charles Bollen)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.