The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in a Network
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- Markus Kinateder, 2013.
"Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 283-294, February.
- Markus Kinateder, 2009. "Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games," Faculty Working Papers 18/09, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
- Kinateder, Markus, 2009. "Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games," MPRA Paper 20443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsRepeated Game; Prisoner's Dilemma; Imperfect Private Monitoring; Net-;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
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