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The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in a Network


  • Markus Kinateder

    () (Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Navarra)


Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoners Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated games history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truthtelling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Kinateder, 2010. "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in a Network," Faculty Working Papers 08/10, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
  • Handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp0810

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    Cited by:

    1. Markus Kinateder, 2013. "Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 283-294, February.

    More about this item


    Repeated Game; Prisoner's Dilemma; Imperfect Private Monitoring; Net-;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation


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