Caveat venditor: The conditional effect of relationship-specific investment on contractual behavior
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- Peter Murrell & Radu A. Păun, 2017. "Caveat Venditor: The Conditional Effect of Relationship-Specific Investment on Contractual Behavior," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 105-138.
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Keywordstransaction cost economics; TCE; contract; contract complexity; property-rights theory; relationship-specific investment; legal system; transition; Romania;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- P3 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
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