Political Disagreement and Delegation in a Multi-Level Governance Setting
A large share of delegation models takes into account the effect of political disagreement when explaining delegation. Yet, delegation models make sharply contrasting predictions on how political disagreement translates into the level of discretion delegated to agencies. Moreover, empirical findings are contradictory. The current paper addresses this puzzle by disentangling mechanisms driving the effect of political disagreement on delegation. Furthermore, we distinguish conditions interacting with the effect of political disagreement on discretion. We apply the conditions to the research context of the present paper: economic restructuring in the UK under New Labour, which took place in a multi-level governance setting. We derive hypotheses on the effect of political disagreement on discretion and explore our theoretical predictions with the use of a novel dataset on economic restructuring in the UK under New Labour (Bennett and Payne 2000). Our analysis show that political disagreement leads to lower levels of discretion delegated.
|Date of creation:||03 Mar 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +353 1 7164615
Fax: +353 1 7161108
Web page: http://www.ucd.ie/geary/Email:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucd:wpaper:201015. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Geary Tech)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.