Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?
Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the value of the transfers of the investor and the delegate, we find that the trusteeï¿½s rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who actually decides gets a higher reward. Delegation only pays off for the initial decision maker if the value of the delegateï¿½s transfer is much higher than the value of the investors transfer.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +41-71-677 05 10
Fax: +41-71-677 05 11
Web page: http://www.twi-kreuzlingen.ch/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:twi:respas:0063. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gregor Govtvan)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.