Network Cooperation and incentives within online communities
The aim of this paper is to understand the rationale of cooperation within online sharing communities. How can we explain the extent of cooperative interactions between anonymous distant Internet users ? We build a game theoretic framework to study the exchange of services within virtual community like in a peer-to-peer network. We show that the coexistence of contributors and free-riders is often a stable situation. We also examine the optimal incentive mechanisms to stimulate contributions by community members.
|Date of creation:||2006|
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