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Gender Bias and Selection Bias in House Elections

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  • Jeffrey Milyo

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  • Samanth Schosberg

Abstract

We demonstrate that female incumbents are of higher average candidate quality than male incumbents. This quality difference is the result of barriers to entry faced by potential female candidates, although the observed effects of this quality differential on vote share are partially masked by the fact that female incumbents are also more likely to be opposed or to be opposed by high quality challengers. Using data from House elections for 1984-92, we estimate that the gender-based differential in candidate quality yields an extra six percentage points of vote share for female incumbents. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Milyo & Samanth Schosberg, 1998. "Gender Bias and Selection Bias in House Elections," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9809, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  • Handle: RePEc:tuf:tuftec:9809
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferreira, Fernando & Gyourko, Joseph, 2014. "Does gender matter for political leadership? The case of U.S. mayors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 24-39.
    2. Amy King & Andrew Leigh, 2010. "Bias at the Ballot Box? Testing Whether Candidates' Gender Affects Their Vote," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(2), pages 324-343.
    3. Bonomy Genny & Brosio Giorgio & Di Tommaso Maria Laura, 2006. "How Italian electors react to gender quotas? A random utility model of voting behaviour," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 200609, University of Turin.
    4. Terra, Rafael & Mattos, Enlinson, 2017. "Accountability and yardstick competition in the public provision of education," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 15-30.
    5. Anastasopoulos, Lefteris, 2016. "Estimating the gender penalty in House of Representative elections using a regression discontinuity design," MPRA Paper 71297, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. repec:bla:econom:v:84:y:2017:i:335:p:454-479 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2012. "Do Female Representatives Adhere More Closely to Citizens’ Preferences Than Male Representatives?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2012-02, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    8. Dino Falaschetti, 2012. "A Sex Difference in Risk Taking and Promotions in Hierarchies: Evidence from Females in Legislatures," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(3), pages 477-502.
    9. Thomas Bassetti & Filippo Pavesi, 2017. "Electoral Contributions And The Cost Of Unpopularity," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1771-1791, October.
    10. Paulo Júlio & José Tavares, 2017. "The Good, the Bad and the Different: Can Gender Quotas Raise the Quality of Politicians?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(335), pages 454-479, July.
    11. David Yu, 1998. "Rational Bubbles Under Diverse Information," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9816, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    12. David Yu, 1998. "Two Equivalence Theorems For Government Finance," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9817, Department of Economics, Tufts University.

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