Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction
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- Byoung Jun & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2014.
"Security bid auctions for agency contracts,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 289-319, December.
- Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2012. "Security bid auctions for agency contracts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 371, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2013. "Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 4554, CESifo.
- Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2013. "Security bid auctions for agency contracts," Discussion Paper Series 1303, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Jos Jansen & Ad Stokman, 2011. "International Business Cycle Comovement: Trade and Foreign Direct Investment," DNB Working Papers 319, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
More about this item
KeywordsHorizontal mergers; takeovers; auctions; externalities; oligopoly;
All these keywords.
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BEC-2010-10-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2010-10-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2010-10-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IND-2010-10-23 (Industrial Organization)
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