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Information Feedback in Public-Bad Games : A Cross-Country Experiment


  • van der Heijden, E.C.M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Moxnes, E.


In this paper we examine the impact of information on individual contributions in a public-bad experiment. We compare two experimental treatments. In the partial information treatment, subjects are only informed about the total contributions by their group, whereas in the full information treatment they get also feedback on the individual decisions of their group members. Both treatments have been performed in two countries: Norway and the Netherlands. The main results are that the average contributions are not significantly different between the information conditions in the two countries. Furthermore, a restart effect, which is often observed in public-good experiments, is also found here.

Suggested Citation

  • van der Heijden, E.C.M. & Moxnes, E., 1999. "Information Feedback in Public-Bad Games : A Cross-Country Experiment," Discussion Paper 1999-102, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:24bc7f13-1382-47d1-95c7-77d03fb4b345

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    Cited by:

    1. Caleb A. Cox & Brock Stoddard, 2015. "Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(4), pages 1-19, September.
    2. van der Heijden, E.C.M. & Moxnes, E., 2003. "Leading by Example? Investment Decisions in a Mixed Sequential-Simultaneous Public Bad Experiment," Discussion Paper 2003-38, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. repec:eee:pubeco:v:161:y:2018:i:c:p:31-43 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Public bad; experiments; information feedback; cross-culture;

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods


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