Tempered Best Response Dynamics
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- Sawa, Ryoji & Zusai, Dai, 2014. "Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 562-577.
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Keywordsbest response dynamic; payoff monotonicity; status-quo bias; switching costs; proper equilibrium; piecewise differential equations;
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2013-03-30 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-03-30 (Microeconomics)
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