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Third party punishment and criminal behavior: an experiment with Italian Camorra prison inmates

Author

Listed:
  • Annamaria Nese

    () (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno)

  • Arturo Palomba

    () (Università di Napoli II- SUN.)

  • Patrizia Sbriglia

    () (Università di Napoli II - SUN.)

  • Maurizio Scudiero

    () (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno)

Abstract

In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a social norm by an uninvolved observer - or third party - whose payoff is unaffected by the behavior of the same agent. In our research, we attempt to improve the understanding of Third Party punishment by reproducing an experiment conducted by Fehr et al. 2004 (TP-PD) with a sample of Camorra prison inmates. We then compare the decisions of the Camorra inmates with the behavior of university students with similar social and economic backgrounds. Our primary conclusion is that there are significant differences in cooperative and sanctioning behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Annamaria Nese & Arturo Palomba & Patrizia Sbriglia & Maurizio Scudiero, 2012. "Third party punishment and criminal behavior: an experiment with Italian Camorra prison inmates," Working Papers 3_226, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno.
  • Handle: RePEc:sep:wpaper:3_226
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    File URL: http://www.dises.unisa.it/RePEc/sep/wpaper/3_226.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2012
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Meier, Stephan & Pierce, Lamar & Vaccaro, Antonino, 2014. "Trust and In-Group Favoritism in a Culture of Crime," IZA Discussion Papers 8169, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Nese, Annamaria & O'Higgins, Niall & Sbriglia, Patrizia & Scudiero, Maurizio, 2016. "Cooperation, Punishment and Organized Crime: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Southern Italy," IZA Discussion Papers 9901, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Camorra; prison inmates; social values; social norms; sanction; punishment; reciprocity; social preference; third party; normative criteria; laboratory experiment.;

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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