Global emission ceiling versus international cap and trade: What is the most efficient system when countries act non-cooperatively?
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- M. Beatrice Lignola & Jacqueline Morgan, 2013. "Asymptotic Behavior of Regularized OptimizationProblems with Quasi-variational Inequality Constraints," CSEF Working Papers 350, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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Keywordsenvironmental game; climate change; international cap and trade system; national emission quotas; global emission cap; normalized equilibria; variational and quasi-variational inequalities.;
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-03-05 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-03-05 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-03-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-INT-2011-03-05 (International Trade)
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