Mirrlees meets Laibson: Optimal Income Taxation with Bounded Rationality
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- Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2015.
"Dynamic nonlinear income taxation with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and no commitment,"
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More about this item
KeywordsDynamic Optimal taxation; Saving; Capital accumulation; Time Inconsistency; Myopia; Minimal Paternalism; Multidimensional Screening;
- A21 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Pre-college
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2010-12-18 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-PUB-2010-12-18 (Public Finance)
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