IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Network Competition and Network Regulation

Listed author(s):
  • Quesada, Lucía


    (Université de Toulouse)

The competitive structure of the telecommunication sector is changing all over the world. Competition is being introduced in the long-distance segments while the local markets remain in general under the control of a (group of) regulated monopolies. This paper tries to find the optimal regulation in the monopoly sector and the optimal access price, taking into account the effects of the competition between networks, any access price plays a role in that it allows the regulator to indirectly control prices in the unregulated segment. We show that, there is no loss of generality in making the access pcices for originating or terminating a call equal. Moreover, under complete information, if networks are poor substitutes, the optimal access price is lower than the marginal cost of access. Under asymmetric information, two effects work in opposite directions. On the one hand, access price is reduced with respect to marginal cost to induce a reduction in final price. On the other hand, access price is increased with respect to marginal cost to give incentives to reveal information.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa in its series UADE Working Papers with number 13_2001.

in new window

Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2001
Handle: RePEc:ris:uadewp:2001_013
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:uadewp:2001_013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mariano E. Gonzalez)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.