Strategic investment in international gas transport systems
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of power relations and strategic investment in the transport system for Russian gas. First, we analyse how the architecture of the transport system determines Russia's bargaining power vis-a-vis (potential) transit countries. By applying the Shapley value as a solution for multilateral bargaining we find that competition between transit countries is of little strategic importance compared to direct Russian access to its customers in Western Europe. Second, we develop a dynamic model of strategic investment. We find that the failure to include Belarus and Ukraine into a framework for international contract enforcement resulted in underinvestment in cheap pipelines and overinvestment in expensive ones. As capacities are increased to gain leverage over transit countries, customers in Western Europe benefit in terms of lower prices and higher supply security.
|Date of creation:||25 Jun 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (+352) 43 79 1
Fax: (+352) 43 79 68 895
Web page: http://www.eib.org/efs/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:eibpap:2007_009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Polyxeni Kanelliadou)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.