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Unbundling Truthful Revelation when Auctioning Bundled Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Courty
  • Daniel Rondeau
  • Maurice Doyon

Abstract

We study truthful revelation when a seller auctions bundles of goods and is interested in learning the buyer’s valuations for each individual good. We generalize the auction rules for the Becker- Degroot-Marschak mechanism and the Vickrey auction to induce truthful revelation.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Courty & Daniel Rondeau & Maurice Doyon, 2015. "Unbundling Truthful Revelation when Auctioning Bundled Goods," Working Papers 2015-05, University of Victoria, Department of Economics, Resource Economics and Policy Analysis Research Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:rep:wpaper:2015-05
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    File URL: http://web.uvic.ca/~repa/publications/REPA%20working%20papers/WorkingPaper2015-05.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shogren, Jason F. & Margolis, Michael & Koo, Cannon & List, John A., 2001. "A random nth-price auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 409-421, December.
    2. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2007. "Mixed bundling auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 494-512, May.
    3. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    4. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    5. Messer, Kent D. & Poe, Gregory L. & Rondeau, Daniel & Schulze, William D. & Vossler, Christian A., 2010. "Social preferences and voting: An exploration using a novel preference revealing mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 308-317, April.
    6. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 170-177, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auction; truthful revelation; Becker-Degroot-Marschak mechanism; Vickrey auction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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