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Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics


  • Nan Yang

    (Business School, National University of)

  • Jeffrey Campbell

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)

  • Jan Tilly

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Jaap Abbring

    (Tilburg University)


This paper develops an econometric model of firm entry, competition, and exit in dynamic oligopolistic markets. The model entertains market-level demand and cost shocks, sunk entry costs, and parameters that capture economic barriers to entry and the toughness of price competition. Nevertheless its analysis is very simple, because it takes firms to be homogenous. We show that the model has an essentially unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium that can be computed quickly by solving a finite- sequence of low-dimensional contraction mappings. We develop a nested fixed-point procedure for the model's maximum-likelihood estimation from market-level panel data and compare the procedure's performance to that of a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints approach. The framework is rich enough for a range of applications, such as the welfare analysis of licensing requirements, start-up subsidies, and environmental laws. Moreover, its analysis provides a starting point for the solution of more general models.

Suggested Citation

  • Nan Yang & Jeffrey Campbell & Jan Tilly & Jaap Abbring, 2013. "Very Simple Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics," 2013 Meeting Papers 673, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed013:673

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    Cited by:

    1. Liang, Qiao & Hendrikse, George, 2016. "Pooling and the yardstick effect of cooperatives," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 97-105.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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