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Worker Matching and Firm Value

Author

Listed:
  • Eran Yashiv

    (Tel Aviv University)

  • Espen R. Moen

    (Norwegian School of Management)

Abstract

This paper studies the value of firms and their hiring and firing decisions in an environment where the productivity of the workers depends on how well they match with their co-workers and the firm acts as a coordinating device. Match quality derives from a production technology whereby workers are located on the Salop circle, and depends negatively on the distance between the workers. It is shown that a worker's contribution in a given firm changes over time in a nontrivial way as co-workers are replaced with new workers. The paper derives optimal hiring and replacement policies, as well as optimal stopping rules, and characterizes the resulting equilibrium in terms of employment, wages and distribution of firm values. The paper stresses the role of horizontal differences in worker productivity, as opposed to vertical, assortative matching issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Eran Yashiv & Espen R. Moen, 2009. "Worker Matching and Firm Value," 2009 Meeting Papers 624, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:624
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
    • J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs

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