Revealed Preference in Game Theory
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- repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:563-567 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013.
"Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
- Susan Snyder & Indrajit Ray, 2004. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 407, Econometric Society.
- Indrajit Ray & Susan Snyder, 2013. "Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games," Discussion Papers 04-14r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont, 2013.
"Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable,"
Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2521-2534, November.
- Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont, 2013. "Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable," Cahiers de recherche 01-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- BOSSERT, Walter & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2013. "Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable," Cahiers de recherche 2013-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Demuynck, Thomas & Lauwers, Luc, 2009.
"Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-15, January.
- Thomas Demuynck & Luc Lauwers, 2009. "Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/252245, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Rehbeck, John, 2014. "Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 207-210.
More about this item
KeywordsNash equilibrium; Testable implications; computational complexity;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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