Naive Learning and Game Play in a Dual Social NetworkFramework
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- T. Börgers, 2010.
"Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
378, David K. Levine.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521857406 is not listed on IDEAS
- Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2010.
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 218-244.
- Canning, D., 1990. "Social Equilibrium," Papers 150, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521674096 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lorenz, Jan, 2005. "A stabilization theorem for dynamics of continuous opinions," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 355(1), pages 217-223.
- Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson & Guillermo Moloche & Stephen Weinberg, 2005. "Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000480, UCLA Department of Economics.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
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