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Bank Incentives, Contract Design, and Bank Runs

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  • Andolfatto, David

Abstract

We study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig Green-Lin model with a strategic banker.

Suggested Citation

  • Andolfatto, David, 2007. "Bank Incentives, Contract Design, and Bank Runs," MPRA Paper 8146, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8146
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8146/1/MPRA_paper_8146.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Green, Edward J. & Lin, Ping, 2003. "Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    4. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
    5. Krasa, Stefan & Villamil, Anne P., 1992. "Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 197-221.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sanches, Daniel R., 2014. "Banking panics and protracted recessions," Working Papers 14-37, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    2. Zhiguo He & Asaf Manela, 2016. "Information Acquisition in Rumor-Based Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(3), pages 1113-1158, June.
    3. Huberto Ennis & Todd Keister, 2016. "Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 335-363, February.
    4. Zhiguo He & Asaf Manela, 2016. "Information Acquisition in Rumor-Based Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(3), pages 1113-1158, June.
    5. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2009. "Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1996-2020, September.
    6. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2008. "Run equilibria in a model of financial intermediation," Staff Reports 312, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    7. Hajime Tomura, 2010. "Liquidity Transformation and Bank Capital Requirements," Staff Working Papers 10-22, Bank of Canada.
    8. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2010. "On the fundamental reasons for bank fragility," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 1Q, pages 33-58.
    9. Tarishi Matsuoka & Makoto Watanabe, 2017. "Banking Panics and Liquidity in a Monetary Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series 6722, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. Jasmina Arifovic & Janet Hua Jiang, 2014. "Do Sunspots Matter? Evidence from an Experimental Study of Bank Runs," Staff Working Papers 14-12, Bank of Canada.
    11. Kocherlakota, Narayana & Wright, Randall, 2008. "Introduction to monetary and macro economics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 1-4, September.
    12. Arifovic, Jasmina & Hua Jiang, Janet & Xu, Yiping, 2013. "Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2446-2465.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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