Acceso de la banca de desarrollo al banco central: El caso de COFIDE y las tasas de interés en el Perú[Access of development banks to the central bank: The case of COFIDE and interest rates in Peru]

This paper discusses the consequences of the restricted access of COFIDE and other financial intermediaries, legally different from banks and financiers, to the monetary instruments with which the central bank provides liquidity through its window operations and its market operations. The paper briefly reviews the nature of the typical objectives of development banks and the central bank in order to establish that there is no conflict of interest between them in the long term, but rather can obtain synergies of an active mutual coordination both ways. The regulatory framework that explains the restrictions on access to the central bank and its consequences for the interbank market is summarized below, the non-access premi-um for COFIDE is quantified in the period from 2005 to 2007 and it is shown that, in a situation of speculative stress, the volatility of such non-access premium has even exceeded the very high interbank premiums seen in the recent international financial crisis of 2007-2008. Finally the performance assumptions of the lender of last resort are inspected and it is proved that, as they are not fulfilled, there is action room in order that the access to monetary instruments of central bank by de-velopment banks helps to improve the performance of the interbank market and deep the liquidity of the secured loan market.