Agents’ behaviour in financing italian transport infrastructures
The aim of the paper is to critically describe the behaviour of the main Italian transport infrastructural agents (national roads and rails, highway, airports concessions) in the field of infrastructure financing. All the actors are trying to avoid the effects of regulation and, at the same time, to reinforce their dominant position and power. The thesis of the paper is that the funding and building of new infrastructures is often the pillar of this strategy, since this is the field where the legal framework is weaker. A short review of the present normative is followed by the description of the behaviour of the main agents. Recent planning documents will be commented, pointing out the tendency of the regulated monopolists to find out new strategies to maximise their objectives. Among these, the proposal of new infrastructures is the field where monopolists are more active and where regulation should be more effective.
|Date of creation:||2009|
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