L’assegnazione della casa familiare: profili di efficienza ed equità[The Allocation of the Family Home: Issues of Efficiency and Equity]

This paper examines the allocation of the family home under Italian law (Art. 337-sexies of the Civil Code) through a multidisciplinary lens that integrates civil law, sociology, and Law & Economics. While formally aimed at preserving the child’s domestic habitat and ensuring the best interest of the child, the analysis reveals that this measure functions as an indirect redistribution of economic value, significantly impacting parental income capacity and the practical implementation of co-parenting principles. By applying the theory of regulatory takings and the ECHR proportionality tests, the article highlights the shortcomings of the current allocation system which, in scenarios of inverse income asymmetry, can lead to deadweight losses in social welfare and drive the excluded owner toward poverty. The research develops an original economic analysis, introducing a child welfare function where the minor’s utility depends both on residential stability and on the economic and relational balance between parents. The findings demonstrate that excessive imbalances can lower the quality of co-parenting, making rent-free allocation counterproductive even for the child’s best interest. Finally, the study addresses the ISEE paradox, proposing the introduction of imputed rent as a flexible compensation mechanism and a reform of asset calculation criteria to treat the allocated property as temporary bare ownership, thereby harmonizing allocative efficiency with distributive justice.