Medicracy, Second Version
We study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could afford to recruit better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional electoral systems than in majoritarian electoral systems.
|Date of creation:||01 Feb 2007|
|Date of revision:||01 Apr 2010|
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